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A TANGO TALE: ON THE CLOSURE OF THE ARGENTINE 
FULLY FUNDED SYSTEM 
 
Gustavo Ferro1 and Fernando Castagnolo2
 
ABSTRACT 
 
With an early welfare system, Argentina’s demography is more similar to the South 
European countries than to the majority of Latin American ones. The country reformed its old 
fashioned Pay-As-You-Go system in the 1990s, introducing a Fully Funded scheme, which was 
intended to solve the financial stress of the social security, as well as to yield positive 
externalities on the financial system, the savings rate and economic growth. After 15 years of 
functioning, the system was closed, their affiliates sent to Pay-As-You-Go again, and the 
accumulated savings went to the public social security administration, which is in charge of 
future benefits. The official explanation for such an ending was that the international financial 
crisis was a peril for future pensioners, and also that the (private) pension funds administrators 
were   not the proper managers of the funds. In the Congress, the political majorities for this 
reform were remarkable strong in both chambers. Protests of the saving accounts owners were 
not loud, in a country with a tradition of mass demonstrations. 
How it happened? Why? Did pension fund administrators work properly for their affiliates, given 
the constraints they faced? Can we learn some lessons, relevant to other countries with similar 
characteristics (i.e., Latin American, Eastern European or Central Asian), besides the uniqueness of the 
local circumstances? We think so, and we worked on developing the lessons of this experience. 
We debate on the process and we asked if it could occur in some other place. We conclude that it 
can, since weak political consensus on the reform is built. It also could happen when the objectives and 
the instruments are not properly differentiated. Are we in search of fixing the social security or of 
promoting national savings? Also, the marketing and the counter marketing of the reform could polarize 
the debate, and to difficult the per se complex consensus. Finally, the counter reform has unexpected pay- 
offs, since making implicit the public debt due to the social security system, and the sudden disposal of a 
source of resources to finance the State budget increases the appeal of eliminating the Fully Funded 
scheme. The long run responses of the ageing process and the short run political horizon add up to the 
counter reform coalition. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Argentina reformed an old-fashioned Pay-As-You-Go system in 1994, creating a parallel 
system comprised by a new Pay-As-You-Go scheme and a Fully-Funded one, based on 
individual accounts run by pension fund administrators (PFA). The fully funded scheme 
introduced in 1994 suffered a shock since the 2002 Argentine macroeconomic crisis. Half of its 
portfolio was formed by public debt (mainly denominated in American Dollars). The assets were 
property of 9 million affiliates, and the whole portfolio value rose to 20000 million dollars. 
Argentine government defaulted its debt during year 2001 and four years latter it issued new 
bonds in replacement of the defaulted ones. This implied a 40% haircut on average and also a 
modification of currency and terms for pension fund portfolios. However, the government 
allowed a new valuation system that hid the losses. During 2007 important changes were 
introduced to the system: maximum commissions were set by law; disability and death benefits 
were modified; those older, lower income affiliates with small balances in their accounts were 
automatically transferred into the Pay-As-You-Go Regime, and the other affiliates were allowed 
to switch from one pension system to the other. Two on eleven million affiliates transferred their 
balances to the state and moved to the Pay-As-You Go system. The figure includes voluntary as 
compulsory shifts. Finally, during the third quarter of 2008, the fully funded system was 
eliminated, and both its assets and affiliates were transferred to the Pay-As-You-Go regime. 
The official explanation for such an ending was that the international financial crisis was a 
peril for future pensioners, and the PFA were questioned as the proper managers of the funds, 
which went to the public social security administration. In the Congress, the political majorities 
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for this reform were remarkable strong in both chambers. Protests of the saving accounts owners 
were not loud, in a country with a tradition of mass demonstrations. 
How it happened? Why? Did PFA work properly for their constituents, given the 
constraints they faced? Can we learn some lessons, relevant to other countries with similar 
characteristics (i.e., Latin American, Eastern European or Central Asian), besides the uniqueness 
of the local circumstances? We think so, and we worked on developing the lessons of this 
experience. 
This paper reviews how the system was eroded, modified and eliminated starting from 
year 2002. It is also analysed by means of a Markowitz Efficiency frontier, how PFA behaved, 
given their regulation and the market stimulus they received. The third objective of this paper has 
been to understand why this system was abandoned after one and a half decade, returning to a 
system with better initial parameters than in 1994 (retirement age, demanded years of 
contribution, benefit determining formula), but with demographic problems that can only worse 
with time (more beneficiaries, and less contributors). 
After this introduction, the next section describes the system at the moment of its 
elimination. Afterwards, the 2002 crisis together with the system modifications are analysed. The 
third section summarises the reforms implemented in 2007. The fifth section resumes the legal 
instrument that removed the fully funded system. In the sixth section the efficiency frontier is 
constructed, arriving to the conclusion that the portfolio regulations (intended to assess individual 
risk of each instrument) leaded to a sub optimum group of portfolios. In addition, it is shown that 
given the regulation on portfolios, PFA portfolios were located in the efficient sector of the 
frontier. The last section closes with some final reflections.   
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II. The system which was eliminated 
Although the system had reached almost 11 millions affiliates, after the 2007 reform it 
was left with 9.5 millions, of whom only 3.6 millions (38%) were regular contributors in June 
2008. The 10 PFA (after the last merge in July 2008) controlled almost 99000 million pesos 
(approximately 30000 million dollars). 
 
Table 1: Dimension of the fully funded regime in Argentina (Amounts at June of each year) 
Period Affiliates (Thousands) 
Contributors 
(Thousands) 
Contributors/ 
Affiliates 
% 
Funds 
(Millions of AR $) 
1995 3843 2033 52.91% 1364 
1996 5245 2586 49.30% 3838 
1997 5820 2987 51.32% 7345 
1998 6696 3275 48.91% 10102 
1999 7475 3366 45.03% 13861 
2000 8104 3349 41.33% 18714 
2001 8624 3332 38.63% 22166 
2002 8977 2859 31.85% 35142 
2003 9275 3108 33.51% 42918 
2004 9712 3620 37.27% 47660 
2005 10317 3995 38.73% 58447 
2006 10959 4341 39.61% 74874 
2007 11670 4669 40.01% 95872 
2008 9488 3600 37.94% 98808 
Source: Superintendencia de AFJP (PFA Regulator) 
 
Table 2: Market of each PFA (Affiliates, Contributors and Fund) 
 Affiliates  Contributors  Funds  
 (Thousands) (Share) (Thousands) (Share) (Millions of AR 
$) 
(Share) 
Arauca Bit 1153 12.20% 482 13.40% 10294 10.40% 
Consolidar 1316 13.90% 535 14.90% 17968 18.20% 
Futura 401 4.20% 126 3.50% 1325 1.30% 
Máxima 1017 10.70% 375 10.40% 11609 11.70% 
Met AFJP 1359 14.30% 524 14.50% 18322 18.50% 
Nación 920 9.70% 422 11.70% 14864 15.00% 
Orígenes 1805 19.00% 628 17.40% 17968 18.20% 
Previsol 326 3.40% 131 3.70% 2447 2.50% 
Profesión + Auge 659 6.90% 213 5.90% 1332 1.30% 
Prorenta (30/6) 319 3.40% 87 2.40% 1705 1.70% 
Unidos (30/6) 213 2.20% 78 2.20% 975 1.00% 
Unidos (since 1/7) 532 5.60% 165 4.60% 2680 2.70% 
All PFA 9488  3600  98808  
Source: Superintendencia de AFJP (PFA Regulator) 
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Since January 1st of 2008, the historical contribution of 11% was restored. This 
contribution has been lowered to 5% at endings of 2001 and later augmented transitorily to 7%. 
The wage ceiling considered for contributions was also raised.   
 The system’s average commission was limited to a maximum of 1% of the salary subject 
to contributions since the fees accrued in April 2007, being the Executive Power able to reduce it. 
The Table 3 reproduces the evolution of the pension funds, expressed in current Argentine 
pesos and American dollars, and also the returns evolution. In current pesos it represented 98.8 
billions and in current dollars it reached 32,6 billions. Its return in dollars reached 0,8% during 
the last year, against a nominal return of –0,2% in pesos. 
Below it is shown the system’s global portfolio composition, and each item evolution, at 
endings of June of 2008. 
 
Table 3: Time Evolution of Pension Funds and its Rate of Return (at June of each year) 
Date 
Accumulated fund 
(In current million 
Pesos) 
Accumulated fund 
(In current million 
Dollars) 
Nominal Annual 
Return (In pesos) 
Nominal Annual 
Return (in Dollars) 
1995 1364 1366 0.00% 0.00% 
1996 3838 3842 21.50% 21.50% 
1997 7345 7352 22.20% 22.20% 
1998 10102 10112 0.70% 0.70% 
1999 13861 13861 4.80% 4.70% 
2000 18714 18714 10.90% 10.90% 
2001 22166 22166 4.70% 4.70% 
2002 35142 9762 41.10% -60.80% 
2003 42918 15552 21.60% 58.60% 
2004 47660 16211 6.40% -0.10% 
2005 58447 20407 16.70% 19.80% 
2006 74874 24456 20.00% 12.30% 
2007 95872 31337 28.30% 28.40% 
2008 98808 32651 -0.20% 0.80% 
Source: Own elaboration on Superintendencia de AFJP (PFA Regulator) 
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Table 4: Portfolio Composition (June 2008) 
Instrument Percentage over total (June 2008) 
Availabilities  0.77% 
National Debt 51.96% 
Fixed Time Deposits 5.50% 
Stocks (Domestic) 12.20% 
Stocks (Foreign) 8.97% 
Others 21.37% 
Source: Superintendencia de AFJP (PFA Regulator) 
 
 
III. The 2002 crisis and the changes to the system 
 
III.1. Crisis, public debt “haircut”, and regulatory changes 
 
Several regulatory changes were introduced to the regime since it was created in 1994. At 
the end of 2001, Argentinean government defaulted its debt due to a strong financial crisis. This 
default had a significant impact in PFA portfolios, which had a 50% exposure on public debt, 
mainly denominated in American dollars. A debt swap was implemented since June 2005. This 
process implied a 40% “haircut” in the value of the debt held by the PFA. Nevertheless, a special 
accounting treatment allowed them to keep national debt in its portfolios without loosing its 
nominal value if those bonds were maintained until to maturity. In this way, the portfolios did not 
reflect the haircut. This process is detailed in Ferro and Romero (2008). 
   
III.2. Regulatory changes before and during the crisis 
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Following Ferro (2004b), this section describes the most important changes in the period 
2000-2001. The first modification implemented referred to the way that the undecided affiliates 
were assigned among the PFA. Before this changes, the new workers who do not choose between 
Pay-As-You-Go and Fully Funded, went to the latter, and if they do not choose between PFA 
they were assigned to one of them by an administrative procedure. Additionally, a minimum 
number of contributions were needed in order to shift between PFA. By contrast, after the 
regulatory changes, those undecided affiliates were assigned to the PFA that charged the lower 
commission, in the geographical affiliate’s residency area; giving incentives to the system’s 
efficiency. 
Furthermore, personal contributions were transitorily reduced from 11% to 5% of the 
wage in December of 2001. In March 2003 they were raised to 7% and returned to 11% at the 
beginning of 2008. The mentioned reduction had a macroeconomic purpose in a context of 
depression. The reduction in contributions, created a financial distress to the regime, and raised 
the participation of commissions in the contribution, worsening the public perception on this 
system. 
 During the crisis, the required ratings for the instruments allowed in the portfolios were 
relaxed, being this one logical consequence of the general downgrade in the credit quality of local 
financial instruments. 
 
III.3. Portfolio changes due to crisis (2001-2005)  
During Argentinean default, national debt in the PFA portfolios, expressed in Dollars, 
Euros and Pesos for an equivalent of USD 17,330 millions was replaced by new issued debt 
valuated in USD 10,126 millions. This operation implied a nominal reduction of 41.57%, but the 
loss was not registered thanks to the new accounting treatment allowed for these instruments. 
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Of the new debt issued in replacement of the old, 60.13% were bonds that were valued 
without reflecting any nominal loss if they were maintained until maturity, 21.45% were non 
negotiable bonds, valued mark to market and the other 10.08% were guaranteed non negotiable 
loans to the National Government.   
 
Table 5: National debt swap and PFA portfolios as of June 2005 
Expressed in millions, except when mentioned. 
Instrument Previous New 
Bonds in Dollars US$ 15400  
Bonds in Euros € 1400  
Bonds in Pesos AR $ 700  
“Cuasi Par” in Pesos  AR $ 23010 
“Boden 2014” in Pesos  AR $ 3540 
“Discount” in Pesos  AR $ 2655 
“Discount” in Dollars  US$ 295 
Value in Pesos AR $ 51464 AR $ 30075 
Value in Dollars US$ 17330 US$ 10126 
Value in Euros € 14322 € 8378 
Percentage of loss  41.56% 
Exchange rate at the time of the swap 1 ARS=0.337 USD = 0.279 EUR, USD 1.21 = EUR 1 
Source: Ferro and Romero (2008). 
 
IV. 2007’s Reforms 
On February 1st, 2007, the executive Power sent to the Congress a project to reform the 
social security regime. That reform was enacted as law 26222. The project set as its objectives: 
1. To improve the system’s coverage. 
2. To ensure freedom of choice between pay-as-you-go and fully funded 
schemes. 
3. To strengthen equity and transparency 
4. To rise the replacement rate (pension/salary) 
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5. To assure the financing of the system. 
6. To lower PFA administrative fees. 
7. To increase the participation of the State in the system. 
8. To guarantee a minimum pension to both regimes beneficiaries  
In order to achieve those objectives, the following changes were introduced: 
1) New workers had 90 days, (since they start to be employed or registered as 
independent workers) to choose between the Pay-As-You-Go and the Fully Funded 
Scheme. In case they have not chosen once that time has passed, it would be assumed 
that they preferred the Pay-As-You-Go regime; as has been said, previously the 
default option was the fully funded regime 
2)  Choosing the public system would imply that the affiliate’s contributions would be 
assigned to finance this regime. Public system’s benefit was raised by 76.5% (as its 
estimation changed from 0.85% to 1.5% multiplied by the years of contribution, times 
the last ten working year’s average salary)  
3) Affiliates could change the regime they have chosen once in every five years. 
4)   Those men older than 55 or women older than 50, who were affiliated to the Fully 
Funded regime, and whose individual capitalization account did not reach $20000 
(approximately USD 6000), would be compulsory transferred to the public regime. 
Their savings would also be transferred to the public regimen. Only those affiliates 
who expressed their will to continue in the private regime could remain in it.  
5) The PFA commissions would have a cap of 1% of the salary subject to contributions. 
The Executive Power reserved the option to lower that percentage. 
6) A minimum, since 5% to 20% of the PFA portfolios would have to be formed by 
securities whose objective were to finance “productive or infrastructure medium or 
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long-term projects”. This fund would be gradually accumulated, following a five-year 
chronogram, established by the Executive Power. 
7) Contributions for disability and life coverage were changed in the fully funded 
regime. Every PFA would form a special fund, financed with the balances of the 
affiliates. Before the reform, commissions charged to the wages of the beneficiaries 
financed those benefits. 
8) Affiliates not included in 4), that is with higher balances in their accounts, could also 
shift to the pay-as-you-go on a voluntary basis within a six months period. 
 The Fully funded regime reduced its size after the reform. Between January 2007 and 
June 2008, this regime lost 16.09% of its affiliates and 21.12% of its contributors. The proportion 
of affiliates older than 45 years reduced in one third. Furthermore, the regime suffered a 
qualitative change; since it lost low salary affiliates with small-accumulated balances and 
relatively advanced ages. This modification implied an increase in the ratio fund to affiliate, 
which grew at the same rate than the official salary index (“CVS”). By contrast, the collections 
per affiliate and per contributor rose well above that value. This phenomenon implies that the 
remaining affiliates had greater incomes, also that the limit of contribution was raised and that 
formal job continued to recover after its collapse in 2002.         
V. The end of the fully funded scheme 
Argentinean Fully Funded regime was eliminated by law 26425 and decree 2099, both of 
2008. The reform of the previous year was enacted on the premise that a massive shift of 
affiliates was going to take place, since the public perception of the system was not good. But 
just two on eleven million affiliates shifted, and one million were the compulsive shifts due to 
small balances in the accounts (under AR $ 20000). The 2008 new reform simply absorbed and 
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substituted the fully funded scheme by the public Pay-As-You–Go regime. The working time 
computed when the affiliates were part of the private regime was considered, in order to obtain 
the individual benefit, as if they had contributed to the public regime. Pension for all workers was 
unified at 1.5% of the average salary of the last ten working years, multiplied by the years of 
contribution (minimum thirty). The actuarial consequences of the reform were not publicized, 
and to the best knowledge of the authors, if they do exist, they are not public until current times. 
  The public regime started to pay benefits under phased withdrawal agreements between 
affiliates and the PFA. Annuities already contracted remain in hands of the insurance companies 
where the policies were issued. 
The assets that formed the individual capitalization accounts of affiliates and beneficiaries 
of the private regime, were transferred to the Social Security National Administrator (ANSES by 
its acronym in Spanish), and converted into the “Sustainability Guaranty Fund” of the public 
regime. Those assets could only be used to pay the benefits of the new public system. 
The law stated that Fund’s assets would be invested “following security and return 
criteria, contributing to the sustainable development of the real economy, in order to guarantee 
the virtuous circle between economic growth and increase of social security resources”. 
Additionally, the new public Fund has to be invested domestically. 
The PFA would be compensated with bonds of the national debt up to their net worth. 
Meanwhile, PFA employees could join public sector institutions, such as ANSES, and the 
Federal Public Revenue Administration (AFIP). 
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VI. Have the PFA done well their jobs? 
Following closely Castagnolo (2008), in this section we test the job the PFA have done. 
Firstly, we know that financial theory suggests that it is possible to obtain an optimal portfolio 
frontier, in terms of mean and variance of its return. Secondly, every restriction, which does not 
allow portfolio managers to reach that frontier, leads to sub optimal results. With those 
considerations, this section tries to find out if the portfolio restrictions imposed by law at the time 
of the reform worked when the Argentinean Fully Funded System existed were efficient, and if 
the PFA portfolios were placed at the efficient section of the restricted frontier. Markowitz’s 
Mean Variance Model is used to analyse how this restrictions altered the feasible frontier, and 
how efficient were the PFA given the regulatory regime they faced.  
      
 
VI.1. The data 
 
Monthly data, from January 1998 to June 2008, has been used to analyse the performance 
of the PFA. In order to develop the model, it was necessary to create two different databases; one 
included the weights of each instrument of the different PFA, and the other referred to the returns 
of each of those instruments  
Along the period of analysis, the average portfolio was strongly concentrated in four 
instruments: Public Debt (54.56%), Time Deposits (12.01%), Domestic Shares (13.52%) and 
Mutual Funds (5.53%). 
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The behaviour of the different funds were strongly correlated, bringing up a correlation 
coefficient greater than 0.9 in nearly all cases. Given this behaviour, it is possible to analyse the 
system as a whole. 
The Law 24241, which introduced the fully funded in 1994, limited the weights that 17 
different financial instruments could represent in the portfolios of the PFA. Although it would be 
better to have one price and return series per each instrument listed in that law, it was only 
possible to elaborate one data base form by nine instruments (all the more important included, but 
excluding some of the instruments with low individual weights or discontinuous quotations). 
Since many national Public Debt securities have defaulted and were valued at their 
accounting value, we used indexes elaborated by the Argentinean Capital Markets Institute 
(IAMC per its acronyms in Spanish) to consider their returns.   
For Time Deposits, we have used the reference rate for deposits of more than a million 
pesos, and a term shorter than 60 days, published by the Argentinean Central Bank. 
When considering Mutual Funds, we have noticed that PFA invested mainly in Money 
Market Mutual Funds (which are not traded at Capital Markets), that is why we have used a 
benchmark provided by Itaú Capital Asset Management, adjusting it by the real return obtained 
in the last period by the most important Funds.  
Foreign financial instruments (Shares and Public debt) were analysed since the S&P index 
and T-bonds, as they were the most representative securities of these categories during the period 
of analysis. Additionally, the index “Merval Argentino” was used to represent the behaviour of 
domestic shares. The use of indexes above mentioned follows two objectives; first simplifies the 
analysis to a more reduced group of variables, and second, it addresses not only the rigidities of 
investing in foreign markets, but also the risk qualification floor, assuming that PFA would invest 
only in leading instruments of each market.  
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Finally, we have chosen YPF shares (formerly the national petroleum company, which 
control package was sold to Spaniard Repsol in the 1990s) to represent shares of Privatised 
National Companies. This election obeyed to the fact that the mentioned instrument presented 
high liquidity and was traded regularly (though we could obtain regular quotations). This fact did 
not happen with other species of the same instrument. 
 
VI.2. The model 
 
The Markowitz’s Mean Variance Model (1959) is used as a benchmark in order to address 
if the PFA did well their job. According to that model, a portfolio is efficient if it maximizes its 
return given a determined risk level (measured by the variance of the portfolio’s return), or when 
the variance is minimized given a determined return. We used the variance minimization 
approach, which can be expressed as follows:  
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Where  is the portfolio’s market variance;  the weight of each asset in the portfolio; 
E
2
mσ ix
i the expected return of asset i; Em the expected return of the portfolio and σi j  the covariance 
between assets i and j. 
In order to obtain a standard measure which magnitudes adopted values between 1 and –1, 
we use the correlation coefficient
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Afterwards, differentiating the Lagrangean by the n weights of individual assets invested 
in the portfolio, the next first order conditions are obtained. 
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Those n equations and the two constraints, form a system of n+2 equations with the same 
number of unknowns. Although the weights of each instrument of the portfolio that solve the 
minimization problem can be obtained from the system, those weights are observed in the 
market, and the real unknowns are the returns of each asset. 
This system is solved replacing equation (6) in the n-1 equations (5), obtaining: 
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Solving the system of n equations and n unknowns, the solution yields the returns needed 
to have a market in equilibrium at level Em.
 
VI.3. Results 
 
The quantitative restrictions imposed by the regulations, had generated portfolios with 
lower returns and higher risk levels than those that could be obtained if PFA were allowed to 
invest without restrictions. Using the returns and covariance of the different instruments, we have 
calculated Markowitz frontiers with and without restrictions, Figure I shows that the regulated 
portfolio with quantitative limits is inferior to the minimum variance portfolios that could be 
obtained if the restrictions were not imposed. Only the restrictions on Foreign Financial 
Instruments, Mutual Funds -highly correlated with Time Deposits-, and Time Deposits itself, 
were binding within the period of analysis. With regards to Foreign Financial Instruments, it is an 
expected result, because PFA could have been able to reduce Argentinean market risk due to 
international diversification, by investing more in those instruments. Mutual Funds and Time 
Deposits had a low volatility in the period of analysis.  
When analysing the restriction about Mutual Funds and Time deposits, the result is more 
surprisingly, but it is mainly because those were the only options that PFA had to invest in non-
risky instruments. Mutual funds risk is strongly correlated to Time deposit’s, which due to its 
nature have limited volatility. The Figure also shows the Markowitz frontier, lifting the Foreign 
Financial Instruments constraint. It is shown that if the restrictions on International Financial 
Instruments were relaxed, PFA would have been able to reach portfolios with considerably higher 
returns than the actual returns.  
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The average portfolio composition, return and variance of the system during the 10 years 
under analyses have been calculated in order to analyse if the PFA behaved efficiently given the 
regulated constraints on portfolios. 
Figure II shows that the average system’s portfolio located in the efficient part of the 
frontier. This result indicates that PFA have behaved efficiently even when the regulation they 
faced was not efficient. PFA obtained the best results they were allowed to. 
Additionally, the same analysis has been done for the average portfolio of three of the 
most important PFA (Consolidar, Met and Arauca Bit). As Figure II shows, all of them search a 
portfolio allocation, which placed in the efficient part of the frontier, and at a small distance one 
from another and to the system ‘s average portfolio. During all the period of analysis, the 
portfolios were highly correlated between PFA, given the incentives the regulation set. 
Finally, the system’s average portfolio was efficient given the imposed restrictions, and 
yielded a monthly deviation of 5.29% and a monthly return of 0.92%.  
Without the quantitative restrictions, PFA would have been able to obtain a monthly 
return of 2.35% facing the system’s average portfolio risk level, or they would have been capable 
to maintain the historic return of 0.92%, but facing a deviation near to 1%, or less than one fifth 
the risk they actually assumed since the regulation.  
In the hypothetic situation that an agent realized monthly contributions of $ 100 in 40 
years, facing a deviation of 5.29%, he would have $ 57,993 in his personal account if his PFA 
had to face law’s 24241 restrictions. By contrast, if the PFA were restricted just to an upper risk 
limit of 5.29%, the agent’s personal capitalization account would reach an amount of $ 79,237 
(37% higher than if the quantitative restrictions by instruments were imposed).  
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Figure I
Markowitz Frontiers, with binding constraints, lifting Foreign Financial Instruments restriction, 
and unconstrained
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Figure II
The PFA Actual Portfolios in the Markowitz Constrained Frontier
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Figure III
The effect on the PFA returns lifting regulatory constraints (same risk)
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VII. Final considerations. 
 
The reform was launched fifteen years ago with the expectations of: 
1. Mending bad vices of the previous Pay-As-You-Go regime (lax rules to 
qualify to benefits, low retirement age, few years of contribution demanded, 
several redistributions, benefit erosion due to manipulation of indexation 
formulas). 
2. Solving the old system’s deficit (which firstly required to consolidate pending 
debt with the pensioners, and to allocate tributary resources to finance the 
system). 
3. Gaining efficiency and transparency. 
4. Promoting savings, finance development and economic growth. 
The goal 1 was partially addressed with some parametric reforms that remain (the age of 
retirement was delayed in five years, the minimum of year of contributions was risen from twenty 
to thirty, and the benefit formula in the pay-as-you-go-system is less generous than before, even 
that it was reformed in 2007, and that its actuarial basis is not clear). An index formula was 
recently approved. The redistributive potential of the system clearly fell, being bounded initially 
to a universal benefit and more recently to a minimum pension. Achieving the goal 2 was ever a 
matter of time, since necessarily it was a transition since the old pay-as-you-go remained with 
obligations but some resources were capitalized in the individual accounts of the fully funded 
scheme. The goal 3 was partially achieved. On transparency there are less controversies; the 
efficiency of the system is another issue, since it was expensive. The goal 4 is difficult to be 
judged in the context of this work. Since the long transition needed, it is not clear the promotion 
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of savings and its consequence, the economic growth. On finance development, the local market 
did not achieve the complexity and development than the Chilean market did. That phenomenon 
could be explained by the different maturity of the systems, and also by the fiscal developments 
in each country: Chile virtually eliminated its public debt during the last two decades, meanwhile 
Argentinean public debt went from US$ 60 billion in 1994 to US$ 140 billion in 2001. The 
crowding out was unavoidable. 
During its life, the system accumulated resources and critics, but scarce beneficiaries 
since it was formed by young population, with an average age of around 40 years at the moment 
of its closure. 
Critics could be classified in two strands: one more technical stated that the system was 
expensive in terms of commissions and much of its costs were seen as a waste of resources in a 
mimic of competition between PFAs; also the system exhibited low coverage since it demanded 
strict requirements in order to access to benefits when the labour market faced both strong 
unemployment and informal market growth in the 1990s3. The other strand is perhaps more 
ideological. It was supported by who always opposed to the regime: left wing politicians, labour 
unions, state bureaucracy and some intellectual circles. They criticised it by stating that the 
regime lacked of solidarity and reduced strongly the intra generational redistributions. This critics 
also argument about the low coverage the new system yielded.    
The system was affected by different shocks before, during and after the 2002 default. Its 
portfolios were flooded with public debt securities whose valuations were manipulated by public 
policies. Although loses were dissimulated by the accountancy treatment, the system was 
strongly affected by the debt swap of 2005.   
                                                 
3 In 2007 a generous contribution amnesty allowed more than one million new benefits (or a 25% growth in 
the number of pensioners). 
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A voluntary regime shift was attempted with the 2007 reform, but only 2 on 11 million 
workers have chosen to return to the public regime. Both financial markets and PFA portfolios 
were hit by 2008 financial crisis. Argentinean financial markets have been declining since the 
beginning of 2007 due in part to the politic interference in the National Institute of Statistics and 
Census.  That organisation computes the Consumer Price Index, which indexes an important part 
of the public debt. When the private system was eliminated, the PFA portfolios had had already 
lost an important percentage of the value they had at the beginning of 2008. The elimination of 
the regime was argued to be a way to protect future pensioners of greater looses.  
Can this happen in other regions? There are countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia with similar reforms. Those reforms can share some of the characteristics that 
made possible the events in Argentina. The possible reforms can have scant consensus in the 
population, they can also be cast in doubt and later reverted. The counter reform can include 
clauses that guarantee benefits as good as the private system’s ones, or even better. Those clauses 
prevent legal actions that could stop the counter reforms, as it is hard to prove detriment to 
affiliate interest.   
Since the facts we referred, we have four broad reflections. The first reflection of this 
investigation has to do with the achievement of political consensus and with the content of 
rational discussions. In a recent document of the Word Bank, Holzmann and Hinz (2005), 
emphasized the three stages sequence of construction of political consensus: commitment to the 
reforms, coalition development and implementation. The sequence is logical, but it has a dynamic 
arithmetic. The coalition support can weaken and could generate the reversion of commitment, 
coalition and implementation. The winners and losers balance generates a coalition. The classical 
rejection of these reforms come from the left wing politicians, labour unions and some groups of 
workers that may have a privileged treatment in the status quo (Huber and Stephens, 2000). A 
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wide consensus could be however hard to construct. Maybe the balance could be reached by a 
correct determination of winners and losers and the logical minimization of the latter ones. Since 
many winners are about to be born, and many losers still have lots of years to live, maybe the 
most reasonable solution (in order to obtain a durable agreement) would be to have a rational 
discussion evaluating efficiently and without exaggerations, the gains and loses. Afterwards, a 
reform where gains and loses take place in the margin is more likely to succeed. In Mexico, for 
instance, an option mechanism for the workers that were most affected by the reform, was 
implemented, letting them to choose between pre and post reform benefits, at the moment they 
retired. That mechanism removes any non-ideological opposition. New entrants to the labour 
market are mandated to register under the new rules. The transition is prolonged, there exist 
potentially undetermined future compromises, but they will still be in place, unless there existed a 
recognition bond that established them at the moment of the reform, and that would not suffer a 
future revision, as in Chile. 
A reform with majority of abstract losers would more easily receive wide and permanent 
consensus. Parametric changes, as the raise in contribution years and retirement age have many 
potential losers, but those loses may be fairly shared in time, and that would augment the 
possibility of establishing a consensus. The rationality of the discussion has to do with reasonable 
demographic projections and objective financial simulations that satisfy different potential 
observers. Not casually it has been so difficult to obtain consensus in democratically mature and 
prosperous societies, with an extended old population. And when the consensus was obtained, it 
only referred to system parameters (Fox and Palmer, 2001) 
The second reflection has to do with the objectives and instruments of the reform. During 
the reform some important but subordinated objectives were emphasized. To promote national 
A Tango—Tale: On the closure of the Argentine Fully-Funded System 
 
25
savings is not the principal function of a social security system4, especially when the reform 
would generate public budget deficit for decades. In a tabula rasa context, that argument would 
have sense, but it does not when a Pay-As-You-Go system with millions of beneficiaries already 
exists (some of whom would continue to be so for several decades ahead) (Barr, 2006). Again, 
the Mexican solution seems reasonable. If the public regime is going to be underfinanced, then 
the private system has to cover 100% of the financial gap during its beginnings. This means that 
PFA portfolios should be allowed to be formed by 100% of public debt during its first years. That 
financial gap would shrink as the closed old system matures and eventually disappears. This is 
confirmed by Chile’s experience. The financial market’s growth would be achieved, as the state 
needs for debt issuing is reduced. Besides, a limit in the amount of debt that the State can place in 
the portfolios would produce a potential crowding out of the financial markets out of the system. 
That potential crowding out leaves two choices; or the system is mostly based in public debt 
during its first years, or the public sector would have to finance itself raising the interest rate of 
public debt and afterwards the specific risk as the debt increases and is each time harder to 
finance. It has been mentioned that foreign investment is an option to protect private savings of 
domestic risk. When the case of an emergent country is analysed, foreign assets are less volatile, 
but they would probably offer a lower rate return. During 2007 PFA were called to repatriate the 
money invested in foreign assets, in order to protect their portfolios of international volatility. 
A third reflection has to do with the marketing and counter marketing of the reform. The 
reforms in Latin America were executed in a period of pro market thoughts, with right wing 
governments and with the support of credits given by international organisms that financed and 
                                                 
4 The system could promote the individual savings, which also could be influenced by the tax system. The 
gross savings are a global result, which can be addressed by means of a stabilizing macroeconomic management. In 
fact, the transition period almost ensured that for many years there could not be expected net savings arising from the 
reform. 
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took part of the reform with technical aid (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). Efficiency was mentioned 
as the leit motiv of the reform. Those strengths became weaknesses when left wing governments, 
with political anti market thoughts had taken place and when the international organisms which 
supported the reforms were questioned. Equity became the most important premise, over 
efficiency. An equilibrated vision should not associate the reform with certain political party, 
fraction or group, because it would be reversed when the opposition party, fraction or group take 
office.  
The fourth reflection is related with some curious effects of the counter reform. The 
reform promised to make explicit public debt, to stop the sometimes hidden and abusive 
redistributions, to take more into account the importance of demography and the fiscal 
equilibrium. The reform moved towards an improvement in the system financing, to limit and to 
individualize benefits by means of more restrictive conditions to achieve them. The counter 
reform returns to solidarity rhetorical, where financial compromises attainment disappear from 
the radar, because the liabilities of the system are spaced in time. The average age of the private 
regime was near 40 years. Women will retire at 60 and men at 65, and their benefit in the public 
regime will be determined as the average of their last ten working years salary. It is important to 
notice that for this group, the benefit determination will start to be defined in an average time of 
10 to 15 years ahead, and will end to define in an average time of 20 to 25 years ahead. As the 
reform made explicit the liabilities of the system, the counter reform hides them.  
The previous reflections can be synthesized by stating that the problems are still there, 
they have never disappeared, but now there is one less instrument (i.e. a fully funded scheme) to 
face them. 
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